artale 7d0e096d61 docs(tac): add antirez export-control corollary to insider-threat note ... Folds antirez's observation that LLM export controls are futile (weights leak, proxies bypass, enforcement requires dismantling encryption) into the existing insider-threat model note. Argues the real safeguard is agent-level sandboxing (OpenShell pattern), not model distribution control — assume any model can run on any hardware.		2026-07-07 13:45:55 +02:00
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loop_engineering.md	docs(tac): add antirez export-control corollary to insider-threat note	2026-07-07 13:45:55 +02:00
plan_assumptions.md	feat(tac): add product factory loop hardening	2026-06-29 11:56:54 +02:00